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in a dishonest manner. The nonresident 
lawyer's professional duty and interest in 
his reputation should provide the same in-
centive to maintain high ethical standards 
as they do for resident lawyers." Piper, 105 
S.Ct. at 1279. Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court of New Hampshire "has the author-
ity to discipline all members of the bar, re-
gardless of where they reside." Piper, 105 
S.Ct. at 1279. Third, the argument that a 
nonresident attorney will not be available 
for court proceedings is unsound because 
in those cases where the nonresident 
counsel will be unavailable on short 
notice, the State can protect its inter-
ests through less restrictive means. The 
trial court, by rule or as an exercise of 
discretion, may require any lawyer who 
resides at a great distance to retain a 
local attorney who will be available for 
unscheduled meetings and hearings. 
Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1280. 
Fourth, the contention that nonresident 
lawyers will not "do their share of pro bono 
and volunteer work" is not necessarily 
true. Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1280. A nonresi-
dent lawyer could be "required to repre-
sent indigents and perhaps to participate 
in formal legal-aid work." Piper, 105 S.Ct. 
at 1280. 
Justice Rehnquist dissented in Piper, ar-
guing that there are substantial reasons 
why a state would discriminate against 
nonresident lawyers. First, 
the State has a substantial interest in 
creating its own set oflaws responsive 
to its own local interests, and it is rea-
sonable for a State to decide that those 
people who have been trained to ana-
lyze law and policy are better equipped 
to write those state laws and adjudicate 
cases arising under them. The State 
therefore may decide that it has an in-
terest in maximizing the number of 
resident lawyers, so as to increase the 
quality of the pool from which its law-
makers can be drawn. 
Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1283. 
Second, since lawyers play an important 
role in the formation of state policy, "they 
should be intimately conversant with the 
local concerns that should inform such 
policies." Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1283. Third, 
the state may have an interest in having 
resident attorneys "bring their useful ex-
pertise to other important functions that 
benefit from such expertise and are of in-
terest to state governments-such as trust-
eeships, or directorships of corporations or 
charitable organizations, or school board 
positions, or merely the role of the inter-
ested citizen at a town meeting." Piper, 
105 S.Ct. at 1283. Fourth, a state does 
have a substantial interest in assuring that 
there not be a delay in litigation due to 
nonresident lawyers. Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 
1285. 
The Court in Piper has promulgated a 
rule which will cause the amendment of, if 
not the abolition of, residency require-
ments for lawyers in at least twenty-seven 
states. The fears of Justice Rehnquist, 
however, do not seem to be sound. Non-
resident lawyers have represented clients, 
with the permission of the courts, on a pro 
hac vice basis for years. By allowing attor-
neys to practice on a regional or national 
level, this ruling will permit the public to 
have a freer hand in selecting competent 
legal counsel. 
-Sam Piazza 
California v. Carney: A MAN'S 
MOBILE HOME IS NOT 
HIS CASTLE 
In Calzjornia v. Carney, 105 S.Ct. 2066 
(1985), the Supreme Court of the United 
States held that federal narcotics agents 
did not violate the fourth amendment 
when they conducted a warrantless search 
based on probable cause of a mobile home 
parked in a public parking lot. In so doing, 
the Court, for the first time applied the 
"automobile exception" to a fully mobile 
motor home. 
Federal narcotics agents had reason to 
believe that Carney was exchanging mari-
juana for sex in a motor home parked in a 
lot in downtown San Diego. The defendant 
was observed downtown as he approached 
a youth and accompanied him back to the 
motor home. When the youth emerged he 
was stopped by the agents who then learned 
that he had received marijuana in return 
for allowing Carney sexual contacts. The 
officers persuaded the youth to return to 
the motor home and knock on the door. 
When Carney stepped out the agents iden-
tified themselves and without a warrant or 
consent, one agent entered and observed 
marijuana and drug paraphernalia. A sub-
sequent search of the motor home at the 
police station revealed additional mari-
juana. 
After unsuccessful attempts to have the 
evidence discovered in the motor home 
suppressed, the defendant pleaded nolo 
contendre to possession of marijuana for 
sale. The California Court of Appeal af-
firmed (People v. Carney, 117 Cal. App. 
3d 36, 172 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1981)), but the 
California Supreme Court reversed People 
v. Carney, 34 Cal. 3d 597,194 Cal. Rptr. 
500, 668 P.2d 807 (1983), holding the 
"automobile exception" inapplicable to a 
motor home. 
Chief Justice Burger, author of the 
Court's opinion, began by reviewing the 
"automobile exception" to the general rule 
that a warrant must be secured before a 
search is undertaken. Carney, 105 S.Ct. 
at 2068. This exception to the warrant re-
quirement had its genesis in Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The 
Court justified the lesser degree of protec-
tion of privacy interests in an automobile 
by relying principally on the ready mo-
bility of the automobile. 
"However, although ready mobility 
alone was perhaps the original justification 
for the vehicle exception, our later cases 
have made clear that ready mobility is not 
the only basis for the exception." Carney, 
105 S.Ct. at 2069. Because one has a lesser 
expectation of privacy in one's automobile 
than one's home, the warrant requirement 
is relaxed notwithstanding the mobility of 
the vehicle. Cady v. Dombrowskl~ 413 U.S. 
433 (1973). "These reduced expectations 
of privacy derive not from the fact that the 
area to be searched is in plain view, but 
from the pervasive regulation of vehicles 
capable of traveling on the public high-
ways." Carney, 105 S.Ct. at 2069. 
The Court was now forced to charac-
terize the motor home as either an auto-
mobile or a home. "While it is true that the 
[defendant's] vehicle possessed some, if 
not many of the attributes of a home, it is 
equally clear that the vehicle falls clearly 
within the exception laid down in Car-
roll . .. " Carney, 105 S.Ct. at 2070. The 
Chief Justice noted that the motor home 
was readily mobile and subject to exten-
sive regulation-the two justifications un-
derlying the "automobile exception." 
However, the Chief Justice made a third 
observation; "the vehicle was so situated 
that an objective observer would conclude 
that it was being used not as a residence, 
but as a vehicle." Id. at 2070. This may 
Fal~ 19851The Law Forum-27 
represent an additional requirement im-
posed on the warrantless search of "hybrid" 
vehicles-those combining "the mobility 
attribute of an automobile ... with most of 
the privacy characteristics of a house." Id. 
at 2071 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Further 
evidence of this additional requirement 
may be found in a footnote to the Court's 
opinion. "We need not pass on the applica-
tion of the vehicle exception to a motor 
home that is situated in such a way or place 
that objectively indicated it is being used 
as a residence." /d. at 2071 n.3. 
Having concluded that the "automobile 
exception" applied, the Court was left to 
decide whether the search was reasonable. 
"U nder the vehicle exception to the war-
rant requirement' [0 ]n1y the prior approval 
of the magistrate is waived; the search 
otherwise [must be such] as the magistrate 
could authorize.'" Id. at 2071 (quoting 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 
(1982». The Court concluded that the 
search was one that the magistrate could 
authorize and was thus reasonable. 
Before Carney, the lower court decisions 
represented a potpourri of theories on the 
applicability of the "automobile exception" 
to motor homes. As a preliminary matter, 
the courts have found difficulty distin-
guishing among motor homes, vans, camp-
ers, pick-ups with tops, and other similar 
vehicles. State v. Francoeur, 387 So.2d 
1063 (Fla. App. 1980). Substantively, 
while the Ninth Circuit held that the 
"automobile exception" is inapplicable to 
a motor home, United States v. Williams, 
630 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 865, (1980); United States V. 
Wiga, 662 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied, 456 U.S. 918, (1982), other circuits 
applied the "automobile exception" to 
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motor homes, camper vans, and other such 
vehicles. See United States V. Combs, 672 
F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,458 
U.S. 1111 (1982). 
Furthermore, even among those courts 
applying the "automobile exception" there 
was disagreement as to when the exception 
applied. Compare United States V. Rol-
land, 740 F.2d 878 (11th Cir. 1984) (ex-
ception applied to motor homes which are 
used for transportation purposes and not 
as dwellings) with State V. Francoeur, 387 
So.2d 1063 (Fla. App. 1980) (exception 
applied to camper van, even if "the defen-
dants were using the vehicle as a living 
accommodation" ). 
Justice Stevens was joined by Justices 
Brennan and Marshall in dissent in Carney. 
The dissent chastised the majority, claim-
ing that "[m]uch of the Court's 'burden-
some' workload is a product of its own ag-
gressiveness [in the fourth amendment 
area, burdening] the argument docket with 
cases presenting fact bound errors of mini-
mal significance." Id. at 2072 (Stevens, J" 
dissenting). On the merits, the dissent 
characterized the Court's opinion as er-
roneous in three respects; "it has entered 
new territory prematurely, it has accorded 
priority to an exception rather than to the 
general rule, and it has abandoned the lim-
its on the exception imposed by prior 
cases." Carney, 105 S.Ct. at 2071 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). 
Despite the dissent's suggestion that 
"some conflict among state courts on novel 
questions of the kind involved here is de-
sirable as a means of exploring and refining 
alternative approaches to the problem", id. 
at 2073 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting), the 
majority has opted for a uniform rule. 
When the United States Supreme Court 
interprets the Federal Constitution the 
state courts are bound by that interpreta-
tion. Of course, state courts may choose to 
rely on their own constitutions, giving 
more protection under the state counter-
part. See State V. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 
673 (S.D. 1976). 
Although the defendant in Carney con-
tended that the California Supreme Court 
decision rested on adequate and indepen-
dent state grounds, the Court rejected that 
contention. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2068 n.l. 
Whether, on remand, the California Su-
preme Court will continue to hold the 
"automobile exception" inapplicable to 
motor homes, this time on state grounds, 
remains to be seen. 
- Edward B. Lattner 
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SPECIAL OLYMPICS 
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